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WILLIAM REYNOLDS VANCE
THE JOURNAL mourns the passing of Professor William Reynolds Vance.
As a dominant figure in the field of insurance law and a widely respected
expert on the law of property, he made enduring contributions to legal
scholarship. As a counselor and friend of generations of law students, he
was ever in the vanguard of legal educators. His impress upon The Yale
School of Law is indelible.
CIVIL LIABILITY UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES ACT
IN the seven years that have elapsed since its passage, the Federal Securities
Act' has not produced many private damage suits. Civil remedies incor-
porated into the Act 2 for the protection of the investor have been invoked
1. 48 STAT. 74 (1933), amended 48 STAT. 905, 15 U. S. C. §§ 77a et seq. (1934).
2. Section 11 of the Act imposes liability on issuers, directors, experts, and under-
writers for frauds and misrepresentations contained in any part of the registration state-
ment required by the Act. Section 12 imposes liability for selling a security (1) in vio-
lation of Section 5 (without a necessary registration having been filed, or by means of a
prospectus deficient under the prescribed standard of Section 10), and (2) in interstate
commerce or through the mails by means of a false or misleading prospectus or oral
communication.
1940] LIABILITY UNDER FEDERAL SECURITIES ACT 91
in sixteen instances,3 only three of which have resulted in recovery by the
plaintiffs. 4 While the in terrorem effect of the Act may have discouraged
carelessness or attempts to defraud,5 the civil remedies provided have not
proven to be the undue threat to free investment of which critics warned."
Although the effectiveness of the liability provisions in protecting injured
security purchasers is still to be demonstrated, the interests which succeeded
in "liberalizing" the liability sections through amendment in 1934 7 are cur-
rently demanding new and further modification of the available civil remedies.8
It is the purpose of this Comment to examine the present status of civil
liability in the light of the cases which have already been decided, to discover
what effect these cases have had on the possibility of recovery by injured
plaintiffs, and to discuss the necessity or advisability of any further statutory
amendment.
The paucity of litigation cannot be traced solely to restrictive interpreta-
tions of the Act by the various courts. The decided cases have been given
only slight publicity, and it is more likely that considerations rooted in the
Act itself, as well as certain external conditions, have been the major factors
in limiting the number of suits. The detailed forms and regulations pro-
mulgated by the SEC have shown registrants what information must be
included in the registration certificates in order to avoid material omissions.
3. Murphy v. Cady, 30 F. Supp. 466 (D. Me. 1939), aff'd, 113 F. (2d) 938 (C. C.
A. 1st, 1940) ; Deckert v. Independent Shares Corp., 27 F. Supp. 763 (E. D. Pa., 1939),
rev'd it part, 108 F. (2d) 51 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939), ccrt. grazted, 309 U. S. 648 (1940);
'Martin v. Hull, 92 F. (2d) 208 (App. D. C. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 726 (1937);
Siebenthaler v. Aircraft Accessories Corp., C. C. H. Securities Act Serv. S 30,202 (V.
D. fo. 1940); Rosenberg v. Hano, 1 C. C. H. Stock Exchange Reg. Serv. 8631 (E. D.
Pa. 1940); Cohen v. Saddlemire, 26 F. Supp. 27 (D. Mass. 1939); Shonts v. Hirliman,
28 F. Supp. 478 (S. D. Cal. 1939); Balls v. Lawrence (App. D. C. 1937) (unreported) ;
Stanford Univ. v. National Supply Co. (N. D. Cal. 1940, No. 20462) (still pend-
ing) ; Johnston v. Whitfield (C. C. Perry County, Ala. 1940) (settled out of court);
Rudnick v. Bischoff, 258 App. Div. 608, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 575 (1st Dep't 1040); M. J.
Hall v. Johnson, N. Y. L. J., Feb. 6, 1940, p. 589, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. 1940); Farrell
v. Reynolds, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 117 (Sup. Ct., 1939), aff'd, 16 N. Y. S. (2d) 530 (1st
Dep't 1939); Thorn v. Austin Silver Mining Corp., 171 Misc. 400, 12 N. Y. S. (2d)
675 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Root v. Finney, C. C. H. Securities Act Serv. 930,020 (Sup. Ct.
N. Y. 1937) ; Hofmayer v. Kehaya, N. Y. L. J., Nov. 27, 1936, p. 1902, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.,
N. Y. 1936).
4. Thorn v. Austin Silver Mining Co., Murphy v. Cady, Independent Shares Corp.
v. Deckert, all supra note 3. The last case, however, has been granted certiorari by the
United States Supreme Court, 309 U. S. 648 (1940).
5. See Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act (1933) 43 YALE L. J. 227;
Rodell, Regulation of Securities by the Federal Trade Commission (1933) 43 YALE L. J.
272; Comment (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 1076.
6. Ballantine, Amending the Federal Securities Act (1934) 20 A. B. A. J. 85; Dean,
The Federal Securities Act: I, Fortune, August 1933, p. 51; Seligman, Amend the Fed-
eral Securities Act, Atlantic Monthly, March 1934, p. 370.
7. 48 STAT. 905 (1934), incorporated in 15 U. S. C. §§ 77a cS seq. (1934).
8. See infra p. 102.
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Market conditions since the effective date of the Act have discouraged possible
suit: a large percentage of the new issues of securities has consisted of gilt-
edge refunding activities, and the absence of any serious market crisis has
meant that few investors have suffered any sudden, catastrophic loss. Exercise
of the power to issue stop-orders when the Commission's investigators have
uncovered misrepresentations during the twenty day "waiting period" before
sale,0 the rapid expansion of the exempted private placement' with large
institutional buyers,"' the great cost of litigation with the consequent fear
of throwing good money after bad, and the sheer inability of many injured
investors to discover the facts of the misrepresentation, combined with the
general apathy of investors towards protection of their rights, may have been
of some effect in aborting possible claims.
The liability sections of the Act themselves contain many patent obstacles
to hasty suit. The scourge of the nuisance suit has been largely eliminated
by the introduction of a discretionary power of courts to demand cost bonds
of any plaintiff before the trial of any case ;12 the new requirement that
plaintiffs who purchase a security more than a year after its issuance must
prove their reliance upon the omission or misstatement, may have had a
further discouraging effect.'8 Where there is a clear case of fraud, the
adoption in the Act of a modification of the common law "tort" measure
of damages,' 4 by which a successful plaintiff would receive only the difference
between the price originally paid for the security and its value at the time
of suit,' 5 may have led plaintiffs who are in a position to take advantage
9. S-CURITxFs Acr § 8b. This period has now been made optional with the Commis-
sion by recent amendment, Pub. L. No. 768, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (Aug. 22, 1940) title
III. To the extent that the SEC shortens the waiting periods for certain securities, the
possibility of stop orders preventing suit will be diminished.
10. SECURITiES AcT, § 4(1).
11. See N. Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1940, p. 37, col. 4. The exemption relieves privately
sold securities only from the registration requirements and from liability under Section
11 ; the requirements necessary to avoid liability under Section 12 must still be met. But
see Rudnick v. Bischoff, 258 App. Div. 608, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 575 (1st Dep't 1940).
12. SEcuRiTias Acr, § 11(e).
13. SEcuRTis Acr, § 11(a). The provision applies only "after the issuer has made
generally available to its security holders an earning statement covering a period of at
least twelve months," and this reliance "may be established without proof of the reading
of the registration statement . . ." The restriction will probably not weaken the plain-
tiff's position to any great degree, as reliance has always been implicitly used as the test
of materiality. See FTC Release No. 137, March 23, 1934; Comment (1935) 44 Y.L
L. J. 456, 459.
14. This is the minority rule at common law, but it has been adopted among others
by the United States Supreme Court, Smith v. Bolles, 132 U. S. 125 (1889); the New
York Court of Appeals, Reno v. Bull, 226 N. Y. 546, 124 N. E. 144 (1919). But c/.
Hotaling v. Leach, 247 N. Y. 84, 159 N. E. 870 (1928); RESTATEMENT, ToRTs (1938)
§ 549, Comment c.
15. SECuRrins AcT,. § 11.
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of the more lucrative "contract-warranty" standard10 by which an injured
party receives the difference between the represented and actual value of the
security, to waive their statutory rights in favor of a common law action in
fraud.17 And, of course, while the Act has modified or eliminated certain
of the prerequisites to recovery at common law, the prospective plaintiff must
still be able to show the materiality of the representation, that it is of fact
rather than an opinion,' 8 and his own lack of knowledge of the untruth.
It is as yet impossible to arrive at any definitive appraisal of court reaction
to the civil remedies provided by the Act. Courts have, it is true, decided
against plaintiffs in nine out of the twelve litigated cases, and in so doing,
have called upon one or more of some seven legal propositions. Some of
the limitations imposed have merely the nuisance value of forcing plaintiffs
to conform to strict rules of pleading; others, were they to be followed, would
make the Act in large part unenforceable. About the only generalization that
can be made with any degree of certainty is that there has been a noticeable
tendency to limit plaintiffs' rights to the strict letter of the law, to demand
proof that every statutory requirement has been met, and in some instances
to place impassable technical barriers in the way of any recovery. Yet a study
of the more important decisions affecting the liability provisions of the Act
shows that, in spite of the many harsh restrictions that have been imposed,
there have been several recent decisions notably favorable to claimants.
One of the more hopeful developments from the standpoint of the plaintiff
has been the general trend, under the impetus of the new Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure,' 9 toward joint or representative action on behalf of the
numerous parties who may have been injured by the same false report.20
16. This measure allows plaintiff the benefit of his bargain, and he will recover dam-
ages in excess of his actual losses. It has been adopted in a majority of jurisdictions as
the standard in common fraud and misrepresentation cases. See Legis. (1934) 48 I-Lnv.
L. Rav. 107, 116.
17. Comment (1940) 28 CAxrv. L. REv. 378, 384. In many cases plaintiffs have relied
on both the statutory remedy and a claim at common law. Where the measure of dam-
ages differs, however, plaintiff would presumably be forced to choose between the claims
to be pressed to a judgment.
18. The one case arising so far under Section 9(a) (4) of the Securities Exchange
Act, 48 STAT. 881, 15 U. S. C. §§ 78a et seq. (1934), has been dismissed, one ground
being that a statement that a given stock would advance 15 points in a few days was
"obviously a statement of an opinion" and not a statement of fact. Rosenberg v. Hano,
1 C. C. H. Stock Exchange Reg. Serv. 1 8631 (E. D. Pa. 1940).
19. FaD. RuLas Civ. Paoc., Rules 20(a), 23(a) (3). Consolidation on trial of sev-
eral individually initiated suits is provided by Rule 42(a).
20. In at least four instances group suits of one or another variety have been brought.
In Martin v. Hull, 92 F. (2d) 208 (App. D. C. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 726 (1937),
sixteen suits were started contemporaneously in the same court, and by agreement action
on fifteen was postponed pending the outcome of Martin's claim. Plaintiff lost, and the
other suits were dropped. 3 SEC RaP. (1937) 173. Thorn v. Austin Silver Mfining Co.,
171 Misc. 400, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 675 (Sup. Ct. 1939) involved a suit by several claimants,
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The advantages of such a procedure in spreading the large litigation expenses,
otherwise individually incurred, are self-evident. There can be little doubt
that the various parties plaintiff may join together in the federal courts since
common questions of law and fact, within the meaning of Rule 20, will
necessarily be present in all cases stemming from one falsity.21 It is true
that every individual cause of action will also contain certain unique features
- each plaintiff may have to prove his own purchase, own reliance, own
innocence of the untruth, the time when he discovered the fraud, and the
other individual characteristics of the transaction necessarily precedent to
any recovery. Every joint case, however, may be severed at any time by
the court, acting under Rule 20, for separate decision of the features peculiar
to each complaint. 22 Ordinarily it might be doubted whether possible
claimants would discover the fact of the common misrepresentation simul-
taneously 23 but the chance of joint discovery is made less fortuitous by the
power of the Commission under Section 8(d) to issue stop orders, speci-
fically citing parties for misrepresentations of a nature producing liability
under Sections 11 and 12.24 At least four joint actions have thus been insti-
tuted immediately subsequent to the publication of such stop orders.26 A
recent case has dismissed a contention that the findings of the Commission
in a stop order proceeding should bind the defendant upon later civil suit
arising from the same misrepresentation.2 6 In view of the possibility that
many defendants might allow a stop order to go through unopposed, finding
it cheaper to amend the registration certificate than to contest the order, the
joined for the purpose of the action. Shonts v. Hirliman, 28 F. Supp. 478 (S. D. Cal.,
1939) was a consolidation of three separate suits on trial, two of which already were
being undertaken by a considerable number of persons joined for suit, and the other a
suit by a trustee representing a large number of other shareholders of defendant. Deck-
ert v. Independent Shares, 27 F. Supp. 763 (E. D. Pa. 1939), rcv'd in part, 108 F. (2d)
51 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939), cert. granted, 309 U. S. 648 (1940), was denominated by the court
as a "spurious class action" under Rule 23(a) (3), and a large number of the defendant's
shareholders participated.
21. This may not have been possible prior to the passage of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act (1933) 43 YALE L. J.
227. As to joinder available in state courts see 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) 2178.
22. FED. RULES CIV. PROc., Rule 20(b). See also Rule 42b (separate trials).
23. This is not essential, since if one person became aware of the fraud, he would
hardly find it difficult to persuade other potential claimants to join with him. To date,
howbver, every joint or class action has followed a stop order. See note 25 inlra.
24. SECURITIES ACT, §8(d).
25. Martin v. Hull (stop order against Continental Distillers & Importers Corp.,
SEC Security Act Release No. 289, Jan. 30, 1935) ; Thorn v. Austin Silver Mining Co.
(stop order, SEC Security Act Release No. 1774, July 13, 1938) ; Shonts v. Hirliman
(stop order against Condor Corp., SEC Security Act Release No. 1433, May 11, 1937) ;
Deckert v. Independent Shares (complaint and consent decree, SEC Security Act Release
No. 1759, June 23, 1938), all suepra note 3.
26. Shonts v. Hirliman, 28 F. Supp. 478 (S. D. Cal. 1939) (preliminary oral
opinion).
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decision seems correct.27 Admission into evidence of the findings of the
SEC as some proof of the misrepresentation would seem to be the most that
could reasonably be allowed. 28
The emerging pattern of joint or "spurious class"1m suits, following im-
mediately after SEC stop orders, has raised the question of whether a verdict
in favor of a representative of a "spurious class" might bind the defendant
in a subsequent suit by another member of the class, not party to the first
action. A judgment in favor of the defendant against the class will usually
not be binding upon other members of the class who later sue the defendant30
The rationale for this holding - that every man must be guaranteed his day
in court-has, however, no application to the converse situation, in which
the defendant will have fully litigated many of the same factual issues in
a previous case. The objection to holding a losing defendant bound on the
facts in a later case is not so much any theoretical lack of privity between
the parties, as that the proposed ruling would, in effect, impose on defendants
an obligation to defend each suit, no matter how trivial it might be, lest an
adverse judgment in some minor suit bind him in all future cases. On the
other hand, there seems to be no good reason why defendants should be
permitted continual relitigation of a factual problem already judicially deter-
mined, and it might well be argued that such plaintiffs should be able to fall
back upon the facts proved in a previous suit by other persons defrauded
by the defendant if they were for sufficient reasons unable to intervene in
that suit.3-
27. See Comment (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 1250, 1267. In some cases, however, the
determination of the administrative agency has been given an in ren effect, and the deci-
sion held binding upon defendant in a later civil suit. Goodspeed v. Great Western Power
Co., 33 Cal. App. (2d) 245, 91 P. (2d) 623 (1939) ; accord, Sampson v. Michigan Copper
& Brass Co., 274 Mich. 592, 265 N. W. 472 (1936).
28. It has been suggested that some authority for this position could be found by
analogy to the minority rule holding a prior criminal conviction prima facie evidence in
later civil suits. Eagle Star & British Dora. Ins. Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82, 140 S. E. 314,
(1927); Schindler v. Royal Ins. Co., 258 N. Y. 310, 179 N. E. 711 (1932).
29. FED. RULEs CIV. PRoc., Rule 23(a) (3). See 2 McoaE, FD.AL PPUCTICE: (1938)
§ 23.07.
30. Wabash R. R. v. Adelbart College, 208 U. S. 38 (1903); National Bank of Flor-
ence v. Edwards, 134 S. C. 348, 132 S. E. 824 (1926) ; 2 Moonn, FmAenu Pn.cncE (1938)
§ 23.07, p. 2291. It has been suggested that a judgment against a spurious class should
bind members of the class who had sufficient notice of the first suit but refrained from
joining although such joinder was possible. Towle v. Donnell, 49 F. (2d) 49 (C. C. A.
6th, 1931) ; see WVabash R. R. v. Adelbart College, supra; (1940) 49 Yu.% L J. 1125.
31. While most authorities in denying res judicata to spurious class actions fail to
distinguish between cases where a losing class and cases where a losing defendant are
claimed to be bound on later suit, there is some authority for this distinction. Coca Cola
v. Pepsi-Cola, 6 Harr. 124, 172 At. 260 (Del., 1934) ; accord, Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v.
George Colon & Co., 260 N. Y. 305, 183 N. E. 506 (1932) ; see Comment (1926) 35 YALz
L. J. 607.
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Another liberal opinion in the recent case of Deckert v. Independent Shares
Corp.32 has held that claimants under the Act need not meet the ordinary
requirements of jurisdictional amount in order to sue in the federal courts.
It was there held that Section 22(a) of the Act, in granting concurrent
jurisdiction in civil suits to federal and state court systems, "carved out"
an entire new field for the operation of federal jurisdiction which is to be
granted irrespective of the amount of the claim.3 3 In view of the silence
of the statute upon the problem of any necessary amount in controversy,
it might be questioned whether any deviation from the ordinary jurisdictional
requirements was contemplated; but the decision can be justified upon the
grounds that it would permit small investors as well as large to take advantage
of the more flexible federal procedure.
In a decision of the same temper, the courts have expanded plaintiff's choice
of defendants among the single class of "sellers" made liable by the provisions
of Section 12. In the recent case of Cady v. Murphy,3 4 the First Circuit
Court of Appeals held that stockbrokers may be considered among the persons
selling securities held responsible by the Act. The common law does not
consider brokers to be sellers; title to the securities is held to spring directly
from selling principal to ultimate purchaser, without residing for an instant
in the broker conducting the sale.35 But the court held that the brokerage
activity was included within the Section 2(3) definition of "sale" as "every
. . . disposition of, attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer
to buy."3 6 The import of the decision is not to relieve the selling principals
of all liability; it is still possible for injured parties to go behind the broker
and hold the beneficiary of the transfer responsible.3 If the latter's financial
responsibility is dubious, however, it will be essential, if recovery is to be
a reality, that the plaintiff be given the option of proceeding directly against
32. 27 F. Supp. 763 (E. D. Pa. 1939), rev'd in part, 108 F. (2d) 51 (C. C. A. 3d,
1939), cert. granted, 309 U. S. 648 (1940).
33. SECUITIES AcT, §22(a) provides: "The district courts of the United States
.shall have jurisdiction of offenses and violations under this title . .. and concur-
rent with state and territorial courts of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to
enforce any liability or duty created by this title." The process and venue provisions are
fairly broad, but one claim has been dismissed for failure to establish proper venue for
the suit. Cohen v. Saddlemire, 26 F. Supp. 27 (D. Mass. 1939). But cf. Neirbo Co. v.
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U. S. 165 (1939), (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 724.
34. 113 F. (2d) 988 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940), afrg 30 F. Supp. 466 (D. Me. 1939).
35. Gifford v. Eastman, 251 Mass. 520, 146 N. E. 773 (1925) ; Douglas & Bates, Stock
"Brokers" as Agents and Dealers (1933) 43 YALE L. J. 46.
36. See Douglas and Bates, Some Effects of the Securities Act upon Investment
Banking (1933) 1 U. OF Cm. L. REV. 283; 77 CoNG. REc. 2921 (1933); cf. Securities
& Exch. Comm. v. Starmont, 31 F. Supp. 264 (D. Wash. 1940).
37. An underwriter has thus been held liable where his broker sold an unregistered
security in violation of the provisions of section 5 of the Act. In the matter of Peterson
Engine Co., 2 S. E. C. 893 (1937).
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the broker, or joining him as a defendant with the principal.35 There appears
nothing inherently unjust in thus holding the responsible party liable for his
negligence.
Objection to holding brokers liable has been raised on the ground that,
since Section 12 provides that successful plaintiffs may recover "the con-
sideration paid for such security . . . less the amount of any income received
thereon, upon the tender of such security,"39 it envisions rescission as the
remedy where plaintiff still owns the security at the time of suit, and that
rescission contemplates restoration of the stalus quo only as between the
principals in the sale.40 However, as the court demonstrated, the Act does
not expressly use the word "rescission," and the remedy provided is physi-
cally applicable to guilty brokers. The stockbroker, it is true, may thus be
forced to assume ownership of securities for the first time, but this is hardly
an unreasonable penalty for misrepresentation upon sale.
In the frequent situation where one broker represents both buyer and
seller in making the sale, it is possible to hold him liable for any misstate-
ment,4 ' but the result is not so clear where the broker acts only for the
defrauded purchaser.5 The problem would not often arise, for usually the
sole function of a buyer's broker is to execute an order, the planning of
which was not his concern. Nor, apparently, would any of the Act's defini-
tions of "sell" apply to those instances in which a potential purchaser requests
advice from the broker, acting in the capacity of an investment counselor.43
Where, however, the broker actively solicits authority to purchase a particular
security, he can probably be considered to have brought himself within the
38. The purchaser will usually have transacted his business solely through the broker,
and be unaware of the identity of the original owner. Even if the principal is disclosed,
restrictions of venue under Section 22(a) of the Act might make suit against him awk-
ward or expensive.
39. S urui-us Act, § 12.
40. Brief for Appellants, p. 14, Cady v. Murphy, 113 F. (2d) 938 (C. C. A. 1st,
1940), aff'g 30 F. Supp. 466 (D. 'Ae. 1939); Connolly v. Glenny, 233 App. Div. 193, 251
N. Y. Supp. 288 (4th Dep't 1931); Douglas and Bates, Stoee: "Brokers" as Agents and
Dealers (1933) 43 YALE L. J. 46.
41. He can be deemed to act as a seller's broker in making the representation. See
Douglas and Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933 (1933) 43 YrE L. J. 171, 207.
42. Upon this point the court in Cady v. Murphy came to no definite conclusion. The
district court held that buyer's brokers as well as seller's brokers were liable under the
Act. 30 F. Supp. 466 (D. Mle. 1939). The majority of the First Circuit Court specifically
refused to pass upon the point, but the dissent argued that the issue was raised by the
facts of the case, and that the Act did not apply to such purchaser's brokers. 113 F. (2d)
988 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940).
43. Such misrepresentations might be outlawed by § 206(2) of the Investment Ad-
visors Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 768, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 22, 1940) Title II, but
not if such services are performed without specific compensation incidental to the conduct
of his business as a broker. In any case no provisions are indicated for civil suit under
the Act; any punishment would be purely penal.
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statutory definition of a "seller" as a person "soliciting an offer to buy." 44
In many such cases the broker would be financially interested in the sale of
a specific type of security, and while he may not have actual title to the stocks
or bonds in question, he will certainly know where they can be quickly
secured.4 5 The broker, in such a situation, would be acting in a manner
far different from that ordinarily contemplated by his relationship with the
plaintiff, and liability would therefore be imposed only on brokers who attempt
to appropriate an extraordinary role in the sales transaction.
One recent case 40 imposes a sharp limitation on the seemingly wider choice
of potential defendants under Section 11. Along with the corporate issuer,
its directors, higher officials, the security underwriters, and certain other
experts, accountants are subjected to liability under Section 11 for any mis-
representation appearing in any part of a registration certificate, in the prep-
aration of which they assisted.41 Thus for the first time the accountant is
given the duty of exercising due care for the interests of the general public. 48
Section 11(3) (B) provides that the accountant may avoid this liability if
he can demonstrate that, after reasonable investigation, he had reasonable
grounds to believe in the truth and completeness of the statement made upon
his authority. The opinion in Shonts v. Hirliman40 held that the require-
ment of a reasonable investigation could be satisfied by mere perusal of
matters coming to the accountant's attention through inspection of the "books
at their disposal." The court in this case thus set out as reasonable an in-
vestigatory standard far below that which is customary in the profession
and necessary for the detection of possible contingent liabilities, which must
be listed in the registration statement.5 0 The usual investigation, it appears,
44. See Douglas &-Bates, The Federal Securities Act, supra note 41. An attempted
distinction between soliciting offers and soliciting orders seems completely fatuous. See
Amicus Curiae Brief for the Boston Association of Stock Exchange Firms, p. 4, Cady v.
Murphy, 113 F. (2d) 988 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940).
45. In such cases the line between brokers and independent dealers, who are liable
under the Act, is very thin. "A broker's knowledge of the amount of stock held by a
dealer, its ready availability, and his relationships with the dealer might well make the
certainty of his ability to acquire such stock as clear as if he had legal title to it." Bates
and Douglas, Secondary Distribution of Securities (1931) 41 YALE L. J. 949, 976.
46. Shonts v. Hirliman, 28 F. Supp. 478 (S. D. Cal. 1939), (1940) 38 Mici. L. Thxv.
1103.
47. SECURITIES AcT, § 11 a. In addition, all those who are named as future directors
and all signers of the certificate are made liable.
48. At common law accountants were held to owe no such duty, although actions for
deceit were maintainable under proper circumstances. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255
N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931) ; State St. Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N. Y. 104, 15 N. E.
(2d) 416 (1938).
49. 28 F. Supp. 478, 483 (S. D. Cal. 1939).
50. Regulation S-X, Uniform Accounting Requirements, Rule 3.18, C. C. H. Securi-
ties Act Serv. 6203.18 (1940). Omission to state contingent facts under § 54 of Form
A-l, is an omission of a material fact producing liability under Section 12. In the mat-
ter of Resources Corp. Int'l, SEC Securities Act Release No. 2294, July 11, 1940,
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would include securing information from the responsible corporate officials
as to the extent of any contingent expenditures, legal opinions on the possi-
bility of damages being assessed against the company as a consequence of
any pending litigation, and the inspection of the minutes of stockholders'
and directors' meetings.r' It is true that the discovery of such contingent
liabilities is among the most difficult problems facing the accountant 2 but
the accountant, alone, will be able to bring to light these items of potential
importance to security buyers, and he should therefore be fully liable for any
failure to take whatever means are available and customary in discovering
any such concealed obligations.53
Other restrictions of a more technical nature have been utilized to defeat
plaintiffs' causes of action. Prominent among these are the provisions of
Section 13, limiting the time in which suits may be instituted. The statute
of limitations is ordinarily available only as an affirmative defense, but where
a statute creates a special right of action and, in the same enactment, limits
the period in which this right may be enforced, a plaintiff must specifically
allege and prove the timeliness of his suit.54 Several Securities Act cases
have been summarily dismissed for failure to plead the necessary compliance
with the conditions of Section 13.i
Because the Section provides that any suit must be originated within one
year of the discovery of the fraud, or "after such discovery should have been
made by the exercise of reasonable diligence,"r'1 it has been held that every
plaintiff must allege and prove the date of his discovery of the misstatement
and, further, explain why no earlier discovery was made.57 It is only reason-
51. See Testimony of Expert Witnesses, Hearings before the SEC in the Matter
of McKesson & Robbins (1939) pp. 45, 101, 157, 207, 257, 303, 359, 413, 464, 520, 571,
611 (testimony of 12 separate accountants). The mere certification by the management
that no contingent liabilities exist will not relieve accountants from investigating a de-
fault on a contract. In re Mining & Dev. Corp., 1 S. E. C. 786 (1936). Possibility of
liability under the Securities Act, itself, must be noted. SEC Security Act Release No.
1627, Dec. 2, 1937.
52. Comment (1940) 28 CAur. L. REv. 369.
53. A pending amendment to the Securities Act contains an addition to § 11 which
would deny any defense to an officer furnishing false or misleading information to an
expert, leading to a subsequent falsity in the expert's report. S. 3935, 76th Cong., 3d
Sess. (introduced May 14, 1940) § 11, p. 20. This change would also help accountants
in securing the necessary information as to contingent liabilities.
54. CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 421; Atkinson, Pleading the Statute of Limita-
tions (1927) 36 YAlE L. J. 914.
55. M. J. Hall & Co. v. Johnson, N. Y. L. J., Feb. 6, 1940, p. 589, col. 2 (Sup. Ct.
N. Y. 1940) ; Rosenberg v. Hano, 1 C. C. H. Stock Exchange Reg. Serv. 1 8603, (E. D.
Pa. 1938), complaint amended and new action brought, 1 C. C. H. Stock Exchange
Reg. Serv. 18631 (E. D. Pa. 1940).
56. SEctmrrsrs AcT, § 13. In no case can any action be taken more than three years
after the issue of the security ( 11) or the sale (§ 12). Neither the Securities Exchange
Act, § 18, nor the Public Utilities Holding Company Act, § 16, requires that discovery be
made "by the exercise of reasonable diligence."
57. Shonts v. Hirliman, 28 F. Supp. 478 (S. D. Cal., 1939).
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able that the plaintiff, who alone is in a position to know the facts, be required
to show when the fraud was uncovered, but the requirement that plaintiff
must also show that he acted on his own initiative to discover the fraud at
the earliest possible moment appears much less justifiable. The court in
the Shonts case expressed the opinion that such a requirement would result
in no undue hardship because "stockholders are in a position to inquire and
to detect fraud on the part of officers of a corporation in matters of record,
as they have access to its books and records.""8 Actually the decision would
make any recovery under the Act extremely unlikely. Even if security pur-
chasers were familiar with this duty superimposed upon their rights, they
would not be likely to incur the expenditures of time and money involved
in such a search, on the vague possibility that a given security would not be
as it was represented in the prospectus or registration certificate. If the
buyer were fortuitously advised of information that would normally put him
on inquiry, it would seem just to require him to pursue this lead with reason-
able diligence. 9 Any interpretation of the Section, however, which demands
for its satisfaction "fishing expeditions" where the purchaser has no reason
to believe there was any misstatement, would seem to be a device for distorting
the broad liability provisions of the Act to the edge of worthlessness. 0
A similar treatment of language in a wholly literal sense threatens to make
any enforcement of Section 12 a matter of mere chance. That Section,
evidently for constitutional reasons, provides liability for use of a false or
misleading prospectus or oral communication only when the sale was made
by "the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication
in interstate commerce, or of the mails."' '61 This has been perverted to mean
that each plaintiff must show that his individual purchase (rather than some
portion of the security issue) was made in interstate commerce or through
the mails.62 In the latest decision on the point, it has been further held that
the individual use of the interstate or postal facilities must be in transference
of the false or misleading representation itself, rather than in the physical
58. Id. at 486.
59. Victor Oil Co. v. Drum, 184 Cal. 226, 193 Pac. 243 (1920); Original M. & M.
Co. v. Casad, 210 Cal. 71, 290 Pac. 456 (1930). Persons knowing of their right to sue
upon -a misrepresentation under the Act should not be permitted to stay silent and take
advantage of any sudden shifts in the market for the security prior to the expiration of
the three year outside limit for suits.
60. The extreme position of the court apparently gets its authority from a series of
decisions interpreting a California statute, which contains no mention of any constructive
discovery. CAL. CODE CrV. PRoC. (Deering, 1937) § 328(4). Lady Washington Consol.
Co. v. Wood, 113 Cal. 482, 45 Pac. 809 (1896); Nichols v. Moore, 181 Cal. 131, 183 Pac.
531 (1919).
61. SEcuariEs AcT, § 12(2).
62. Farrell v. Reynolds, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 117 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd, 16 N. Y. S.
(2d) 530 (1st Dep't, 1939), (1939) 34 ILL. L. Ray. 368. The court based its decision
partially upon the use of the singular of "security" in § 12, and the similar singular use
of "security" in § 2(1). But see H. R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) 22.
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conveyance of the security to the buyer. 3 This interpretation would, in effect,
make the Act merely an interstate "Blue Sky" law. The only oral com-
munications encompassed would be those which happened to be made by
long distance telephone, and the section's provisions would apply only to
persons doing business at a distance. It seems evident that such a narrow
construction of the wording will seriously impair the scope of the section,
and must be abandoned if the section is to be of any real use to injured
investors.
Although the measure of the "damages" prescribed by Section 12 as an
alternative to rescission in those cases where plaintiff has sold the security
prior to bringing suit is as yet undetermined, 4 Congress has otherwise largely
removed the problem of damages from the sphere of controversy. Section 11
has adopted a modification of the common law "tort" measure, allowing
recovery to the extent of the difference between the price paid and the value
at the time of suit, or the price received by plaintiff on reselling the security;
rescission has been established as the basic remedy for breach of Section 12.
Only money damages are contemplated; demands for direct injunctive relief
have been rejected.65
Proof of damages according to the prescribed measure is a condition
precedent to any recovery by the plaintiff. Under Section 11, where plaintiff
has retained the securities, the required proof involves evidence of the value
of the securities at the time of suit. In holding that the value so attested
by plaintiff must in all cases be the actual or "intrinsic" value of the security,
rather than the market price then obtainable, the court in Shonts v. Hirlinanco
has further weakened the chances for recovery by plaintiffs resorting to the
Act for relief. The main objection to use of the market exchange price has
been that it does not necessarily reflect the true value of the security, and
that the misrepresentation itself might affect the market, making the exchange
price an inflated gauge of the security's true worth.67 The Securities Act,
however, contemplates only value soundings taken as of the time suit is
63. Siebenthaler v. Aircraft Acc. Corp., C. C. H. Securities Act Serv. 30,202
(AV. D. Mo. 1940). Thus the fact that the securities were in this case shipped from Los
Angeles to Kansas City was held immaterial.
64. It has been suggested that the measure of the "damages" should be the federal
common law test of the difference between the sum paid and the value of the security on
the purchase date, rather than that of § 11. (1936) 31 ILL. L. RE%. 532; McCorancr,
DAMAGES (1935) 461.
65. Deckert v. Independent Shares Corp., 27 F. Supp. 763 (E. D. Pa. 1939) ; reted in
part, 108 F. (2d) 51 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939), cert. granted, 309 U. S. 648 (1940). The court
refused to pass on the issue of whether plaintiffs might get later injunctive relief in aid
of a judgment previously secured and otherwise unenforceable.
66. 28 F. Supp. 478 (S. D. Cal. 1939). In this case there .as no market value, the
defendant company having become a bankrupt. It is possible that the court would have
allowed a positive market value as "some" evidence of "intrinsic value."
67. Hotaling v. Leach, 247 N. Y. 84, 159 N. E. 870 (192) ; RESATMrENr, ToMrs
(1938) § 549, Comment c; McCoaIrcic, DAMAGES (1935) 457.
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brought, when the representations' falsity will be known, and its abnormal
effects upon the market counteracted. 68
It might be difficult for plaintiffs to meet any requirement that they
affirmatively show the intrinsic value of given securities: where capitaliza-
tion of earnings is not available as a test of value, such a figure could only
be derived at high cost 09 through a valuation of the entire wealth of the
corporate defendant. 70 The fairest settlement of the problem would probably
be to allow proof of the market value as plaintiffs' prima facie case, subject
to possible later correction by defendant's showing of a different actual
value.71 This method would prove especially applicable where, due to bank-
ruptcy, the market value has been completely extinguished and where proof
of the actual value of the securities would be even further beyond the capa-
bilities of most claimants.72 The absence of all market value would appear
to indicate, not that this test of valuation had broken down, but rather that
there was no present actual value of the security as an investment; any
evidence which might tend to show otherwise would be more likely to be
within the reach of defendants than of the defrauded investor.
Only by reference to the effect of the decided qases upon the Securities
Act can a fair appraisal be made of the amendments now being proposed
to the civil liability sections of the Act. That a fear psychology may have
gripped the investment banking world as a direct result of passage of the
Act need not be denied; just such a deterrent effect was intended, as a brake
upon the harmful excesses previously existent.7 3 The possibility that further
qualification of the liability might encourage a return to active investment
by the more adventurous spirits in the financial community does not make
such modification per se desirable. If the present wording is to be inter-
preted along the restrictive lines indicated in a majority of the decisions to
date, recovery by plaintiffs will be infrequent and difficult; Congress should
hesitate to weaken the remedial provisions still further merely to allay
imaginary fears. On the other hand, any amendments clarifying the areas
of uncertainty, without substantially impinging upon the rights of injured
68. RESTATMENT, TORTS (1938) § 549, Comment c. Discovery of the fraud or mis-
representation may depress the market temporarily below the actual value. The chance
for such an unearned profit, however, will largely be obviated if defendant is given an
opportunity to bring in evidence of a differing actual value.
69. Plaintiff in the Shonts case figured that, counting exports' fees and all other
items, the valuation would cost about $8,000. Communication to the YAL. LAW JoU0tNAL
from the plaintiff's counsel, October 19, 1939, p. 2ff.
70. Hotaling v. Leach, 247 N. Y. 84, 159 N. E. 870 (1928) ; Davis v. Coshnear, 129
Me. 334, 151 Atl. 725 (1930) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1939) § 911, Comment f.
71. See Legis. (1934) 48 HARV. L. RaV. 107, 114. But see Comment (1934) 44 YALE
L. J. 456.
72. For discussion of difficulty of valuation of bankrupt corporations, see Hotaling
v. Leach, 247 N. Y. 84, 159 N. E. 870 (1928).
73. See note 5 supra.
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investors, should not be dismissed because the unamended Act has proven
less favorable to plaintiffs than might have been desired.
The most important current proposals for amendment are those that have
been advanced by the Committee on Securities Laws and Regulations of
the American Bar Association,74 and the so-called "Brown Bill," already
introduced into Congress at the behest of the Investment Bankers Associa-
tion of America. The Bar Association has until recently advocated wide-
spread limitation of claimants' rights provided in the Act,70 but their repre-
sentatives are now highly skeptical of the necessity for any major alterations
in the civil liability provisions.77 Their main objective now appears to be
a greater uniformity between the liability sections of the various security
regulation acts.78 To the extent that the different problems involved in each
act permit, such uniformity appears desirable, but it does not follow that
this consonance must be sought on the level of the "less stringent" provisions
of the Securities Exchange Act or the Public Utility Holding Company Act.7 0
The other Bar Association proposal would extend the present immunity
from liability for actions taken in conformity with a rule or regulation of
the SEC80 to include courses of action pursuant to one of the legal opinions
74. A.B.A., Report of the Special Conmittee on Securitics Laws and Regulations,
ADVANCE PROGRAM, 63D ANNuAL MEETING, p. 188 (1940). See also Report of the Special
Committee on Securities Laws and Regulations (1939) 64 A.B.A. REP. 337 for a full
exposition of the current proposals.
75. S. 3985, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (introduced May 14, 1940). All action by Congress
on the bill has been suspended until after Jan. 1, 1941, pending a thorough investigation
by the Commission. S. E. C. Releases, June 19 and 21, 1940.
76. Amendments to §§ 11 and 13 proposed by the Special Committee on Amendments
to the Securities Act of 1933 apparently were influential in the amending of the Act in
1934. 59 A.B.A. REP. 212 (1934). Amendments proposed by the Association in 1935
were similar to those now introduced by the Investment Bankers' Association. 60 A.B.A.
RFp. 539 (1935).
77. ". . . Generally, the committee sees no special need for rela.xing the civil liabil-
ity provisions in view of the experience under them, but we recognize that the provi-
sions present a psychological, if not a legal, difficulty to the financial community . .
A.B.A. Report of the Special Committee on Securities Laws and Regulations, AWVANCZ
PROGRAM, 63D ANNuAL MEETiNG, p. 193 (1940). The committee specifically disapproves
of the amendments sponsored by the Investment Bankers Association.
78. SEcuRiirs Acr, §§11, 12; SEcUTIEs ExcHA.NG Acr, §§9(e), 18; PUtuc
UTMIrY HOLDING Co. AcT § 16, 49 STAT. 838 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 79p (Supp. 1939) ;
TRUST INDnaTuRE AcT oF 1939, § 324, 53 STAT. 1149 (1939), 15 U. S. C. § 77wvm (Supp.
1939).
79. Report of the Special Committee on Securities Laws and Regulations (1939)
64 A.B.A. REP. 337. This would mean a general adoption of the provisions of § 18 of
the Securities Exchange Act, 43 STAT. 881 (1934), 15 U. S. C. § 78 r (1934). It differs
from the Securities Act mainly in that it requires plaintiff to prove "reliance" upon the
misrepresentation, even if he purchases within a year of the issuing date, allows recov-
ery only where the original sale price wvas affected by the misrepresentation, and then only
to the extent plaintiff can show that the damages resulted from the misrepresentation.
80. SEcim sAc, § 19(a).
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occasionally made public by the General Counsel of the Commission. The
fairness of such a suggestion need hardly be questioned.81
The various amendments offered in the "Brown Bill" are more far reaching
in scope, and would restrict the provisions for civil suit to a far greater
degree. An amendment exempting any solicitation to buy or any attempted
disposal from the definition of "sell" in Section 2(3) of the Act would appar-
ently wipe out any liability of brokers under the terms of Section 12.82 As
has been indicated, the injured party will often have no real chance for
recovery unless he is to be given the option of proceeding directly against
the broker responsible for the misrepresentation.
Section 11 has been altered in the pending bill so that plaintiff could recover
only such damages as he could prove were caused by the false representa-
tion, and this sum has been limited to the difference between the price at
which the securities were offered to the public, and "the amount which such
securities would have been worth at the time of offering . . . if the untrue
statement had been known . ," Requiring the plaintiff to show the
proportion of his losses directly traceable to the defendant's misrepresenta-
tion adds one further proof problem to the impressive list claimants already
must meet. The defendant, by hypothesis, will have already been shown to
have made a material misstatement for which some damages are owed, and,
other things being equal, it is probably better to risk having the innocent
plaintiff recover somewhat more than he might otherwise be entitled to, than
to have the defendant escape all penalty for his error.8 4 The proposed test
would further eliminate any recovery for losses due to a decline in the value
of the securities after the time of purchase. To be sure, a subsequent decline
in value may be due in part to sources unconnected with the misrepresenta-
tion. But as the falsity may have induced the injured party to buy the security
in question rather than 'some other, or to hold it as an investment after the
market has declined, it seems fair to allow plaintiffs to recover post-purchase
losses which defendant cannot clearly allocate to other causes.8 5
81. Such a provision, however, might have the actual effect of discouraging the Gen-
eral Counsel of the SEC from making public any opinions under the Act.
82. The proposed language would read: "The term 'sale' or 'sell' shall include every
sale or other disposition of a security . . . ; such term shall not include . . . (b) any
attempt or offer to sell or otherwise dispose of, or solicitation to buy any security." S.
3985, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (introduced May 14, 1940), § 1.
83. S. 3985, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (introduced May 14, 1940) § 12. If by chance the
price at which the security were purchased were less than the offering price, the new
wording would make possible an amount of recovery in excess of the loss sustained.
84. Dodd, Amending the Securities Act (1935) 45 YALE L. J. 199, 221.
85. The present Act is not new or unique in allowing damages for losses sustained
subsequent to purchase, due to continued retention of the security. Hotaling v. Leach,
247 N. Y. 84, 159 N. E. 870 (1928); Hindman v. First Nat. Bank, 112 Fed. 931 (C. C.
A. 6th, 1902), cert. denied, 186 U. S. 483 (1902). The test has often been set at value as
of the time of discovery. Cartwright v. Hughes, 226 Ala. 464, 147 So. 399 (1933); Mun-
son v. Fishburn, 183 Cal. 206, 190 Pac. 808 (1920).
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Section 12 would further be modified by the introduction of a requirement
that sale of unregistered securities (where registration is required) or by
means of a defective prospectus, must be "willful or grossly negligent" to
produce liability. Thus the bill would establish as a standard in civil actions
a canon developed for gauging criminality."8 The necessity for any such
change is yet to be demonstrated; no cases have, as yet, been brought under
this section, and there seems to be no reason why potential sellers could
not first take precautionary measure to see that the securities complied with
the simple provisions of Section 5.
Section 12(2) has been split into two divisions in the proposed bill, one
for securities for which a prospectus "is required to be delivered in connec-
tion with the sale," and the other, far more restrictive upon possible plaintiffs,
for securities exempted from this requirement.87 In the latter situation no
statement would incur liability which did not "affect" the price at which the
security was sold8s and, where the statement did affect the market, plaintiff
could still only recover those damages wlich he could prove were caused
by his reliance upon the misstatement.8" It is apparent that under such
restrictions recovery by any plaintiff would be extremely unlikely. 0 More-
over, it has not been made clear why sellers of securities exempted from
compulsory production of a prospectus should not be liable for false oral
communications or for any untruths contained in a prospectus which they, by
option, choose to issue.
Both of the proposed divisions adopt as a test of an untrue statement o
one similar to that used in the Securities Exchange Act,12 and advocated
as a "better equivalent" for the wording of the Securities Act by the Bar
Association in 1935. 93 The suggested advantage of the proposed change is
86. A similar amendment was unsuccessfully proposed by a committee of the Bar
Association in 1934. Report of the Special Committee on Amendments to the Securities
Act of 1933 (1934) 59 A.B.A. REI. 578.
87. S. 3985, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (introduced May 14, 1940) § 13(2), (3).
88. Id., § 13(3).
89. Ibid. See similar suggestion in Report of the Special Committee on Amendments
to the Securities Act of 1933 (1934) 59 A.B.A. REP. 578.
90. However, the requirement for reliance before there can be any recovery seems
more reasonable here than it would in Section 11. Where there is a direct sale the mis-
representation is generally individual in effect and unlike a false statement in a registra-
tion certificate, will not be likely to influence the general market price of the security.
Dodd, Amending the Securities Act (1935) 45 Y.%LE L. J. 199; .- B.A., Report of the
Committee on Securities Laws & Regulations, loc. cit. supra note 74.
91. ". . . By means of a prospectus or oral communication which includes an untrue
statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements in the light of the circumstances under which they were made not mis-
leading..." S. 3985, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (introduced May 14, 1940) § 13, p. 23.
92. "... Which statement was at the time and in the light of the circumstances
under which it was made false or misleading with respect to any material fact." SEvcum-
TIES ExcHANGE AcT, § 18.
93. Report of the Special Committee oan Amendments to the Securities Act of 1933
(1935) 60 A.B.A. RE. 543.
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to make clear that the materiality of a misrepresentation is to be judged
as of the time the statement was made, or the security purchased.04 But this
would seem the normal interpretation of the present wording, whereas the
substitute would apparently absolve sellers of all liability where the state-
ments contain omissions of a material fact, but where such omissions do
not make the remaining statement false or misleading.05
It is clear that further general modifications of the liability provisions of
the Act do not stem from any current rash of excessive recoveries; this fact
alone, however, would not condemn them. The proposed I.B.A. amendments,
it should be noted, are largely of the same calibre of technical restraint on
suit that has been utilized by the courts, acting on their own initiative, to
hinder recovery. They have left intact the basic rights provided for injured
parties, but have surrounded them with barriers making actual relief for
any plaintiff improbable. While the courts continue to impose limits of their
own, general amendment along the same line would seem untimely; if the
Securities Act is to provide a real forum for relief, such procedural obstruc-
tions must be avoided in the Act as well as in its court interpretation.
With a few exceptions, plaintiffs in civil actions have been victims of
extreme legalism in the application of the Act. In limiting the scope of lia-
bility the courts have concentrated on restrictive rulings on procedure and
the situs of the burden of proof to make recovery exceptional. It is probably
incorrect to say that success under the Securities Act is more difficult than
tinder the common law, but motivating much of the strict construction ap-
parently is the idea that the Act, in permitting freer suit against a greater
number of potential defendants, is in derogation of the common law and
therefore should be limited to the literal meaning of its words.
Signs are not entirely lacking of a newer tendency to construe the Act
more in accord with its obvious intent of providing easier recovery for injured
investors. The extension of joint or class suits may help in the avoidance
of ,any continuing procedural impediments by making greater financial
resources available for suit. The present adolescent stage in the Act's devel-
opment is not of indefinite duration, yet its influence on the mature Act
will work to prevent any excessive recoveries. Final judgment must wait
upon high court decisions of the more important points of controversy; it
is to be hoped that a countervailing liberalism will prevent the civil remedies
from becoming merely.,an impotent symbol of Congressional regard for the
rights of investors.
94. Ibid.
95. Dodd, Amending the Securities Act (1935) 45 YALE L. J. 199, 216. Thus omitting
the name of a dishonest promoter would not make the remaining statement untrue, but
would be highly material in that, had it been divulged, many persons would not have
bought the security.
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